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Lecture 
LAWYER FOR THE SITUATION 
By Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.* 
April 2004 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the confirmation hearings concerning Louis Brandeis before the 
United States Senate almost a century ago—hearings evaluating whether 
Brandeis was fit to be a Justice of the United States Supreme Court—
Brandeis was challenged concerning his professional ethics as a lawyer.  
It was charged that he had involved himself in conflicts of interest, trying 
to assist conflicting parties in working out intense differences.  When 
asked who he represented, he responded that he was “lawyer for the 
situation.”1  
That response, undoubtedly, was imprudent.  Mr. Brandeis could 
have said that he represented multiple parties with conflicting interests 
but that he had done so with their informed consent.  The standards of 
professional conduct of the time recognized the propriety of multiple 
representation under those conditions.  Canon 6 of the American Bar 
Association Canons of Professional Ethics, promulgated in 1908, 
provided:  “It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except 
by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the 
facts.”2  The standards of professional conduct still recognize the 
propriety of multiple representation in such circumstances.3 
However, the term “lawyer for the situation” took on a life of its 
own.  The idea had and continues to have great appeal, in contrast to the 
concept of lawyer as advocate.  The argument is that, in various 
situations in practice, lawyers should consider the interests of others and 
moderate their conduct accordingly.  My argument here is that the rules 
                                          
*  Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Distinguished Professor of 
Law, Hastings College of Law, University of California; Director Emeritus of the American 
Law Institute.  B.A. Swarthmore College, 1953; LL.B. Columbia University, 1954. 
1 See Clyde Spillenger, Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L. J. 1445, 1502 
n.194, 1503 n.199 (1996); John Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 
683 (1965); see also GEOFFREY HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 64-65 (1978). 
2 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 6 (1908). 
3 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2003). 
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of ethics and the law governing lawyers already require such 
moderation, to an extent perhaps not appreciated by either critics of the 
profession or zealous advocates of “zealous advocacy” within the 
profession. 
Professional practice as conventionally understood requires a lawyer 
to advance the position and improve the situation of one party against 
the interests of an opposite party.  Up to a point, that convention 
accurately describes the role of an advocate in litigation.  Once a trial has 
started, an advocate is committed to almost unqualified loyalty to one 
client, pitted against an adverse party who, implicitly at least, is 
represented by an equally dedicated advocate.  In this vision, the scene 
of the encounter is a courtroom and the lawyer is performing the role of 
barrister.   
The scenario next dissolves into a conference room in which the 
lawyers are negotiators seated across the table from each other.  In this 
setting the lawyers perform the role of solicitors with similarly 
counterposed orientations.  On the logic of the adversary model, the 
solicitor has few if any obligations to the opposing party or its counsel. 
Much of law practice conforms to this model:  trials, of course, and 
many negotiations.  Perhaps more important, the legal profession’s self-
conception is based on that model.  The classic formulation is that by 
Lord Brougham, in which he proclaimed: 
[A]n advocate, in discharge of his duty, knows but one 
person in all the world, and that person is his client.  To 
save that client by all means and expedients, and at all 
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, 
to himself, is his first and only duty. . . .4 
These strong words—”first and only duty” and “knows but one 
person in the world”—have become the credo of many lawyers, 
particularly when lawyers are called to account for injury to the interests 
of persons other than clients.5  The implications of the credo are found in 
                                          
4 CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 580 (1986). 
5 For an exposition of the unqualified concept of advocacy, see, for example, William 
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 
29. 
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judicial opinions that reject the possibility of imposing legal 
responsibility on a lawyer toward anyone other than a client.6 
However, in fact, law practice involves nearly infinite variations of 
“situation” in which lawyers have legal duties to persons other then their 
clients.  Some of these duties are the minimal obligation to refrain from 
fraud, for example, not counseling a client to commit perjury or to 
destroy evidentiary documents.7  Yet even the minimalist duty to avoid 
fraud contributes in a modest way to civilizing the relationship between 
a client and a third person.  Other obligations to third persons are more 
exacting.  Observance of these obligations reduces the transaction costs 
of total vigilance that an opposing party would otherwise be obliged to 
incur.  By the same token, a duty to others imposes a limitation on a 
lawyer’s duty to his client and therefore creates something of a conflict of 
interest on the part of the lawyer.   
Thus, the scope of a lawyer’s duties, according to the conventional 
advocacy model, is wholly oriented to the client, with a few exceptions 
dealing with extreme cases such as fraud.  On the other hand, the rules 
of ethics can be differently understood, interpreted, and applied than 
according to that credo.  The present analysis is an interpretation of the 
rules of ethics in those terms.  Such an interpretation invites inquiry as to 
why the conventional advocacy model continues to have such attraction 
for the profession.  That is, if we have been speaking prose all along, why 
do we insist that we are speaking otherwise? 
Perhaps the precise focus of the analysis should be made even 
clearer.  I am not suggesting that the rules of ethics should require wider 
scope in representation of multiple parties or necessarily that they 
should be changed to require lawyers to take greater account of the 
interests of parties other than clients.  There is much to be said for such 
changes, and much has been said in support of them.8  The analysis here 
is based on the rules as they now are, including the rules of ethics and 
the rules of law.  By rules of law, I refer to the complex general law that 
                                          
6 The most extreme conception of legitimate partisanship in transaction practice is 
perhaps Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), which countenanced a lawyer’s 
transmittal of a financial statement that, as alleged, he knew to be false. 
7 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d), 3.3, 3.4(a) and (b) (2003). 
8 For a pioneering analysis of such an approach, see Nancy Moore, Expanding Duties of 
Attorneys to “Non-Clients:”  Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity 
Respresentation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 659 (1994). 
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governs everyone, including lawyers, and specifically to application of 
that law to lawyers when representing clients. 
II.  THE “SITUATION” OF AN ADVOCATE 
Even in the core function of advocacy in litigation, the lawyer has 
duties beyond those to clients.  The rules of legal ethics that most sharply 
express the model of advocacy are those governing loyalty and the rule 
of confidentiality and its corollaries.  The basic rule concerning loyalty is 
expressed negatively in terms of conflict of interest.  Model Rule 1.7(1)(a) 
of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
prohibits a lawyer from undertaking a representation if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk 
that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or by the 
personal interest of the lawyer.9 
The epitome of representation “directly adverse” to a client is 
litigation against the client.  A lawyer is not permitted to sue a party that 
the lawyer concurrently is representing in the same or another matter.  
This rule is generally protective of the client, but it goes further, because 
a client cannot consent to such adverse representation.  This limitation is 
explained in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers:  the 
rationale is not simply the interest of the clients involved, but it serves 
the interest of the judicial process in our adversary system.  Its aim is 
that the court be presented with the strongest statements of the 
contending positions, so that the judge may more fully understand what 
is at issue.10  Thus, even the simplest rule of loyalty to the client—
prohibiting the representation of opposing parties in litigation—is 
justified in part by reference to third party interests, in this case the 
interests of the court and its judges. 
More fundamentally, our adversary system considers that litigation 
is not a street-fight.  On the contrary, the system involves a complicated 
cooperative interaction between contending advocates.  The interaction 
commences not later than the filing of the complaint and continues 
through the process of preliminary motions and discovery prior to 
                                          
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2003). 
10 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202 (1997). 
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possible trial.  Indeed, in filing a complaint, the plaintiff’s advocate is 
required to exercise some scrutiny of the substantiality of the claim being 
asserted for his client.  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and its state law analogues, is not a very demanding standard, but it is 
not entirely empty.11   
Beyond the stage of filing the complaint, most litigation is 
terminated not by trial but by settlement.  A settlement by definition 
requires the advocate to consider—that is, to think seriously—about the 
interests of the opposing party.  Arriving at a settlement proposal that 
might be seriously considered requires an understanding of the case 
from the opponent’s viewpoint.  Moreover, there are decisions that have 
set aside settlements in which the advocate for one party failed to 
consider the interests of the opposing party in the course of supposedly 
providing adequate representation of the interests of his own client.  
Here I have in mind the now famous case of Spaulding v. Zimmerman.12 
If a case goes to trial, the competitive-cooperative interaction 
continues, in that the advocates are primarily responsible for 
presentation of evidence and legal contentions.  The normal process of 
trial is a highly mannered but nevertheless cooperative portrayal of the 
competing versions of truth and the disputable issues of law.  The judge 
is much more than an umpire, but the advocates have the laboring oars. 
The procedure is intensely regulated.  In this regulatory scheme the 
ethical rules are essentially secondary.  The rules of ethics generally 
incorporate by reference the rules of criminal and civil procedure that 
directly govern the parties and, through them, the advocates.  Rule 3.1, 
for example, prohibits frivolous legal contentions, but it does not define 
“frivolous.”13  Instead, Rule 3.1 refers to the law of procedure for a 
definition.14  Rule 3.4 similarly has a catalogue of prohibitions cast in 
terms of the standing law of procedure; for example, Rule 3.4(a) states 
                                          
11  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see, e.g., In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re 
Jafree, 444 N.E.2d 143 (Ill. 1982); Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases:  Do Lawyers Really Know 
Anything at All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353 (1986). 
12 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).  The defense lawyer ignored the significance of medical 
information that plaintiff had much more serious injuries than the plaintiff or his counsel 
were aware of; plaintiff was a minor.  Id. 
13  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003). 
14  See id. 
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that a lawyer shall not “unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to 
evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document . . . .”15 
These and similar rules obviously confer legal protection on persons 
other than the client.  Immediate beneficiaries are opposing counsel and 
the opposing party, and secondary beneficiaries are the courts.  The 
ultimate beneficiary is the public, which needs a law-abiding 
adjudicative system. 
The law on this set of obligations is vacuous when stated in general 
terms but endlessly complex when examined in detail.  Stated in general 
terms, the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 105 says only, 
“[i]n representing a client in a matter before a tribunal, a lawyer must 
comply with applicable law, including rules of procedure and evidence 
and specific tribunal rulings.”16 
At the same time, the “rules of procedure and evidence” constitute a 
huge compendium of duties and responsibilities, being entire legal 
subjects unto themselves.  These rules typically are enforced through the 
old-fashioned technique of monitoring by opposing counsel, reciprocity 
among the advocates and remonstrance and, if necessary, by retribution 
by opposing counsel.  The fact that the governing rules are typically 
enforced through informal mechanisms does not diminish their standing 
as rules.  Indeed, one could say that the rules, as enforced through 
professional interaction of advocates, are the “situational” norms of 
advocacy itself. 
However, the rules governing advocacy are also defined, and 
sometimes enforced, through formal process.  A few examples will 
suffice.  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes an 
obligation of minimal integrity and diligence in making allegations 
against an opposing party.  The rule is not very strict but it is not 
empty.17  Rule 26, governing discovery, imposes responsibility on the 
advocate to intercept discovery responses by his client that the lawyer 
knows to be false.18  There are decisions enforcing that obligation.19  Rule 
16, dealing with pre-trial conferences, imposes a duty on counsel to 
                                          
15 Id. R. 3.4(a). 
16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 105 (2000). 
17 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see, e.g., In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
18  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26.   
19 See, e.g., Comm. on Prof’l Ethics v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976) (knowingly 
permitting client to give false testimony in deposition); Miss. Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899 
(Miss. 1994) (false responses to interrogatories). 
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attend and participate on pain of forfeiting the client’s case.20  
Concerning conduct in the trial itself, Rule 3.4(e) requires that a lawyer 
“not allude to any matter that . . . will not be supported by admissible 
evidence,” a duty that has been sometimes enforced.21  The law of 
evidence imposes restrictions on the kind of proofs an advocate is 
permitted to present, for example, those governing expert testimony.22  
And so on.23 
The point can be summarized in two propositions.  First, as stated in 
Canon 7 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, in 
representation of a client in litigation, “[a] lawyer should represent a 
client zealously” but “within the bounds of the law.”24  And second, the 
limits imposed by law on zeal in advocacy are extensive and intensive.  
Furthermore, in my observation these limits are generally observed by 
lawyers in our system, even in an era of intense partisanship. 
III.  “SITUATIONS” IN TRANSACTION PRACTICE 
The circumstances in which a lawyer has obligations to persons 
other than a client are far more extensive in transaction practice than in 
litigation.  Partly this is because litigation, by definition, places other 
parties in a position adverse to the client and hence at an outer region of 
responsibility on the lawyer’s part.  In transaction practice, in contrast, 
the configuration of relationships covers a wide range.  At one end of the 
range, the lawyer may, on the basis of informed consent, represent two 
or more clients whose interests conflict to some degree.  That situation 
would have been an apt description by Mr. Brandeis of his role in at least 
some of the “situations” under discussion in his confirmation hearing.  
At the other end of the range, the lawyer may perform some incidental 
service for an opposing party that entails an arguable element of 
justifiable reliance giving rise to legal obligation. 
A. Multiple Representation on the Basis of Informed Consent 
The rules concerning conflicts of interest in transaction practice 
permit almost any multiple representation, if—and it is a strong “if”—
                                          
20 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16; Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976). 
21 See, e.g., In re Mack, 519 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. 1994) (continuing suspension for failure to 
correct client’s testimony known by the lawyer to be false). 
22 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
23 See generally John Wade, On Frivolous Litigation:  A Study of Tort Liabiulity and 
Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433 (1986). 
24  CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 7 (1908). 
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there is adequately informed consent of all affected clients.  In formal 
terms, the rule prohibiting “direct adversity” can apply to transaction 
matters.  That is, at least in principle some transaction matters present 
“nonconsentable” conflicts.  Comment [7] to the Rule, as amended by the 
ABA in 2002, states that “[d]irectly adverse conflicts can also arise in 
transactional matters.”25  No doubt this is true.  However, no example of 
such a conflict is offered in the Comments.  Rather, Comment [7] 
continues, “[f]or example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a 
business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in 
the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could 
not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each 
client.”26 
The Comment therefore does not define or give examples of direct 
adversity in transaction matters.  Instead, it specifies how such a conflict 
might be overcome, i.e., the familiar formula of informed consent.  This 
suggests that the category of absolutely “nonconsentable conflicts” in 
transaction practice is very narrow indeed.27 
Of course, a lawyer who proceeds with multiple representation on 
the basis of client consent takes a significant risk.  The risk is that the 
relationship among the clients can undergo change, with resulting 
increased conflict in their positions.  So also there is risk that an affected 
client will later become disaffected and assert that the consent was 
invalid.  Typically, the claim will be that an inadequate disclosure was 
made concerning the implications of multiple representation.  The risk to 
lawyers of client defection appears to be much greater these days than in 
the past, simply because clients are more willing to challenge lawyer 
probity and to obtain other legal assistance to do so.  Nevertheless, 
lawyers every day undertake multiple representations on the basis of 
client consent. 
Any case in which a lawyer properly obtains a conflicts consent or 
waiver can be viewed as a “situation” in the Brandeisian sense.  A valid 
consent requires adequate disclosure of the existence and implications of 
the dual representation.  Adequate disclosure of the implications 
                                          
25 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 7 (2003). 
26 Id. 
27 A recent decision that suggests a “nonconsentable” conflict involved the pursuit of a 
patent on behalf of one client while also representing another client engaged in developing 
patentable compounds of a similar type.  See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 
308 A.D.2d 404 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). 
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requires attention to the reasonably possible “worst case” scenarios of 
mutual hostility.  Consent by the clients reflects decisions on their part to 
forego extreme measures so that a single lawyer or law firm can carry on 
for the benefit of both.  When the representations involve the same 
matter, the result is a “situation.” 
B. The Confidentiality Rule  
At this point, it would be well to bring forward a second basic rule of 
responsibility to a client, the rule of confidentiality.  The confidentiality 
rule is a basic support of the duty of loyalty, which has been addressed 
above in analysis of the advocate’s role.   
Fulfilling the duty of loyalty in a representation typically involves a 
measure of confidentiality, i.e., concealment of sensitive facts and 
strategic purposes.  Hence, prima facie a lawyer keeps sensitive facts and 
strategic purposes from everyone but the client.  By the same token, 
acting for the benefit of two or more people—which is what a multiple 
representation “situation” entails—requires a substantial measure of 
disclosure among the several intended clients.  Such a disclosure is 
required in the predicate for consent, i.e., that the consent be “informed.”  
Hence, the concept of lawyer for the situation entails a modification of 
the principle of confidentiality, as well as the principle of loyalty.   
This modification of confidentiality is the predicate of the obligations 
imposed on a transaction lawyer who undertakes representation of 
multiple clients.  On the one hand, the lawyer is required to maintain the 
confidences of each client, except as disclosure is necessary to obtain 
informed consent from the other client.  On the other hand, an adequate 
disclosure is necessary to obtain valid consent.  The definition of 
“adequate” is not simple.  As formulated in the Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 202, Comment c(i): 
[T]he information should normally address . . . 
contingent, optional, and tactical considerations and 
alternative courses of action that would be foreclosed . . . 
the effect of . . . the process of obtaining other clients’ 
informed consent upon confidential information . . . any 
material reservations that a disinterested lawyer might 
reasonably harbor . . . if such a lawyer were representing 
only the client being advised; and the consequences and 
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effects of a future withdrawal of consent by any client 
. . . .28 
It is readily apparent that this formula affords opportunity for 
subsequent contentions that a disclosure was inadequate.  As a 
precautionary matter, a lawyer ordinarily should obtain the consent in 
writing, even in jurisdictions where a writing is not required.29  Where 
the client is a corporation, or other organization with its own law 
department, the consent should be signed or countersigned by the 
company counsel.  Even so, the standard for validity of consent is that 
the lawyer be able to provide each client the full measure of loyalty, 
competence, and diligence that is owed to a client represented alone.30  
Such are the responsibilities of a lawyer for a “situation” in which the 
lawyer has undertaken representation of multiple clients on the basis of 
client consent.    
Unfortunately, there are many decisions imposing liability on 
lawyers who have proceeded on the basis of supposed consent where it 
was subsequently disputed whether consent had been sought and 
obtained, or where the disclosure on which consent was based was 
determined to be inadequate.  However, imposition of malpractice 
liability in such situations is consistent with the notion that a lawyer’s 
duty runs exclusively to clients.  In a multiple representation, the 
“relevant others” are indeed clients. 
1. Responsibilities of Transaction Lawyers to Nonclients 
Many lawyers seem to think that, when representation of only one 
client is involved, such is the end of the matter.  But the rules of loyalty 
and confidentiality are, and always have been, subject to manifold 
exceptions and qualifications.  Some of these exceptions and 
qualifications are directly referenced in the rules of ethics, but others are 
recognized by cross reference or by implication.   
Taken together, these exceptions and qualifications permit or require 
a lawyer in various circumstances to make disclosures of information or 
                                          
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD)  OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202 cmt. c(i) (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 1996). 
29 Written consent has long been required in a few jurisdictions, notably California.  See 
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-310 (2002).  Under the amendments to the ABA 
Model Rules adopted in 2002, a consent must be confirmed in writing in jurisdictions 
adopting the amendment.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2003). 
30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202 cmt. h (1997). 
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take other action that would otherwise be covered by the primary duties 
to the client.  These exceptions and qualifications, in other words, are 
recognitions that lawyers have obligations to nonclients.  Assembling a 
complete catalogue of these “situations” would be difficult, if not 
impossible, but a substantial array can be readily brought into focus.    
2. Impliedly Authorized Disclosures 
An initial exception to the rule of confidentiality is the lawyer’s right, 
prescribed in Rule 1.6(a), to make disclosures “impliedly authorized in 
order to carry out the representation.”31  Of course, there is also an 
exception for expressly authorized disclosures, for example, where a 
client directs the lawyer to make a settlement offer in a negotiation.  But 
the scope of implied authorization is functionally much broader.  In the 
typical client-lawyer relationship, the details of the engagement are not 
explicated; rather, they are implied from the undertaking itself.   
The undertaking in a client-lawyer relationship primarily concerns 
transmission of information—making contentions and proposals and 
supporting them with argument and information.  Transmissions that 
would “reasonably” further the objectives of the representation are 
impliedly authorized, the “reasonably” concept referring to 
professionally recognized standards and professional judgment.  Thus, a 
lawyer can disclose the availability of his client for an interview, or the 
acceptable scope of a due diligence visitation by an external auditor, or 
the status of client filings with a regulatory authority, and so on—all 
without express authorization of the client.    
However, these disclosures are governed through regulation, rules 
of professional ethics, and legal obligations imposed by the general law.  
Under Rule 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules, a lawyer may not give false 
information in such a disclosure.32  Giving false information that is 
material would constitute fraud under general principles of law.  As 
such, it would be a violation of Rule 1.2(d) of the professional rules, 
which forbids assisting in a crime or fraud, and would also be a basis for 
civil and possibly criminal liability on the part of the lawyer.33  
Moreover, under tort law as it has evolved, fraud includes not only 
positive falsity but disclosures that are misleading because incomplete.  
As stated in Comment [1] to Rule 4.1, “Misrepresentations can also occur 
                                          
31  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003). 
32 Id. R. 4.1(a). 
33 Id.  R. 1.2(d). 
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by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the 
equivalent of affirmative false statements.”34 
In many circumstances, the lawyer’s implied authority to make 
truthful disclosures becomes a mandatory duty to do so.  A lawyer is 
always governed by the duty under Rule 1.3 to provide diligent 
representation.  Diligent representation includes the obligation to 
transmit information to the extent reasonably expected under recognized 
standards of competence.  Hence, lawyers have duties to convey 
information that is not misleading.   
The term “not misleading” of course implicitly requires 
identification of those who might be misled.  For example, a 
communication adequate to an experienced liability insurance executive 
ordinarily would not be adequate in a communication to an ordinary 
householder.  Often communication must be made to several people or 
many.  Gauging the circle of addressees and the terms of the 
communication must be based on assessment of the circumstances, i.e., 
the “situation.”  
3. “Blowing the Whistle” 
The most intense debates about the rules of professional ethics in 
recent years have involved other exceptions to the rule of confidentiality.  
These exceptions were pejoratively characterized as “blowing the 
whistle” and understandably caused great concern within the bar.  The 
professional debate began with the presentation of the Kutak Committee 
recommendations concerning Rule 1.6, which were largely rejected by 
the ABA House of Delegates in 1983.  The debate at the national level 
more recently culminated in the adoption of the Cheek Report 
recommendations by the House of Delegates in 2003.  The revisions of 
Rule 1.6(b) adopted in 2003 essentially corresponded to the revisions 
rejected twenty years earlier. 
Rules 1.6(b)(1), (2) and (3) now would permit (but not require) a 
lawyer to disclose client confidences to prevent death or serious bodily 
harm or to prevent or mitigate financial fraud in which the lawyer’s 
services have been exploited by a client.35  For legal, reputational, or 
moral reasons, a lawyer may feel required to make disclosures that these 
exceptions permit.  Hence, in operative effect they can indeed involve 
                                          
34 Id.  R. 4.1 cmt. 1. 
35  Id. R. 1.6(b)(1), (2), and (3). 
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“blowing the whistle.” Accordingly, the question then becomes:  When 
and to whom is a whistle to be blown? 
The answer to the question of “when” is simply but opaquely “when 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary,” as stated in Rule 1.6(b).36  The 
obvious answer to the question “to whom” is the prospective victim, but, 
as noted in Comment [6] to Rule 1.6, there are instances when it would 
be appropriate to make disclosure “to the authorities.”37  The more 
general point is that a lawyer can feel an unavoidable obligation to 
protect third parties from victimization by the lawyer’s client.38  Lawyers 
only rarely have to deal with clients threatening victimization in the 
form of homicide or assault.  But, given that much of law practice 
involves dealings with money and property, clients who may be 
committing fraud are more commonly encountered.  Determining how 
to proceed often can be a “tough situation.” 
C. Escrows and Other Fiduciary Undertakings 
Another kind of “situational” responsibility arises from various 
fiduciary undertakings to third parties that are designed to complete a 
transaction.  A common type is acting as an escrow agent to assure 
proper transfer of money (or other property) to consummate an 
agreement.  Examples include escrow of purchase money or title deeds 
in a real estate closing; filing of legal documents that regularize or 
officially record a transaction; after settlement of a litigation claim, the 
disbursement of funds among the client and other designated recipients 
such as health care providers; obtaining required verifications of 
corporate or government documents; and so on.39 
It is perfectly clear that in all such undertakings, the lawyer is 
undertaking obligations to third persons.  The rules of ethics explicitly 
recognize some of these obligations, particularly those concerning the 
handling of money.  Rule 1.15 treats money due to third persons on a par 
with money due to a client, so far as the lawyer is concerned.  
Accordingly, the lawyer is required to keep the funds in a trust account 
and to embargo a distribution if there is a dispute as to proper allocation 
of the funds.  Parallel obligations can be derived from other ethical 
                                          
36  See id.  R. 1.6(b). 
37  See id.  R. 1.6 cmt. 6. 
38 See Purcell v. Dist. Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997) (threat to commit arson). 
39 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56, cmt. e (1997). 
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obligations, particularly the obligation to be truthful (Rule 4.1) and to 
avoid conduct involving dishonesty (Rule 8.4(c)). 
Courts are coming to recognize that these ethical obligations should 
be reinforced by legal obligations in favor of third persons injured by 
their breach.40  However, many courts still resist this conclusion.  There 
is understandable fear about putting lawyers in positions adverse to the 
immediate interest of clients, or in positions where the lawyer has to 
make a judgment call.  There remains some resistance to the idea that a 
lawyer can ever be civilly liable to someone other than a client.  
Imposition of liability, in my opinion, could properly require a high 
standard of proof, based on the idea that a lawyer is an officer of the 
legal system and, as such, is entitled to a kind of prima facie immunity.  
But the evidence of breach can be quite plain.  A common example is the 
improper distribution of settlement process in litigation.  What possible 
social interest is furthered by exonerating a lawyer who gave all the 
settlement proceeds to the client (except, of course, the contingent fee!) 
and stiffed the hospital and the doctors? 
D. Corporate Clients 
Much, if not most, of modern law practice involves representation of 
corporations and other organizations.  The basic rules are set forth in 
Rule 1.13 of the ABA Model.41  These rules apply in representing 
business corporations and nonprofit corporations, partnerships, 
unincorporated associations, and, with certain modifications, 
government agencies.  All of these organizations can be regarded as 
“situations.” That is, they involve interactions with persons who are not 
clients, who have interests of their own that may not be wholly 
consistent with the clients’ interests, but whose aims and concerns have 
to be taken into account by the lawyer in the course of representing 
corporate clients. 
The beginning point is stated in Rule 1.13(a), that the organizational 
client is “acting through its duly authorized constituents.”42  Comment 
[1] to 1.13 recognizes the simple fact that the entity “cannot act except 
through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other 
constituents.”43  Rule 1.13(b) recognizes that conflicting interests can be 
                                          
40 See  id. § 42. 
41  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003). 
42  Id. 
43  See id. R. 1.13 cmt. 1. 
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involved.  Thus, the corporate constituents may be engaged in acts or 
have purposes that are “a violation of a legal obligation to the 
organization or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to 
the organization” with consequent “substantial injury to the 
organization.”44  If so, the lawyer “shall proceed as is reasonably 
necessary in the best interest of the organization.”45  
Rule 1.13(b) identifies various responses the lawyer may undertake 
to fulfill the responsibility to act in the best interests of the corporation.  
All of these responses in one way or another would interrupt or overrule 
the proposed course of action of the corporate operative.  If necessary, 
what is called for is “referral to the highest authority that can act on 
behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.”46  
Rule 1.13(f) moves in a somewhat different direction.  That rule 
requires the lawyer to explain the identity of the client (i.e., that it is the 
corporation) to a corporate constituent who does not seem to understand 
the direction of the lawyer’s primary loyalties.47  This explanation is by 
hypothesis addressed to someone who is not the client, or at least not the 
only client.  As recognized in Rule 1.13(g), a lawyer may represent both 
the organization and one of its constituents.48  But such a dual 
representation is governed by the conflict of interest standard in Rule 1.7 
and the disclosure and consent provisions in that Rule.  The newly 
adopted Sarbanes-Oxley statute and regulations appropriate these 
concepts into a federal regulation of companies whose shares are 
publicly traded. 
The issues involved in representation of corporations and other 
organizations are almost endlessly complex.  They certainly have evoked 
almost endless discussion—generally very serious discussion—by 
members of the corporate bar.  However, the point for present purposes 
is simple, even if, perhaps, not simply understood. 
The people that a lawyer deals with in representing a corporate 
client are not clients.  In legal contemplation, none of them are clients—
the members of the board, the high level management, the corporate 
officials at intermediate levels, and the ordinary operatives at the 
                                          
44  See id. R. 1.13(b). 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. R. 1.13(f). 
48  Id. R. 1.13(g). 
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bottom.49  Yet, their interests must be considered at every stage of a 
corporate representation.  Indeed, a lawyer’s representation of a 
corporation would be a practical impossibility except by consideration of 
the interests of the corporation’s “constituents.”  From this viewpoint, 
representation of a corporation is yet another “situation.” 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The idea of “lawyer for the situation” is nearly an anathema to 
lawyers who embrace the good old fashion religion uttered by Lord 
Brougham.  They hold to the proposition that a lawyer “knows no other 
duty” than to a client.  At the same time, the idea of “lawyer for the 
situation” is eagerly embraced by many critics of the profession, 
particularly those concerned with excessive partisanship on behalf of 
powerful clients.  It is not always clear exactly what obligations these 
critics would impose—perhaps a responsibility always to be a mediator.  
However, as I hope the foregoing analysis has shown, the obligations of 
advocates and transaction lawyers in modern practice involve many and 
varied duties to third persons.  Many of those duties are enforceable 
under the law of professional malpractice as it stands and is evolving.  
Whether some of those duties should be extended or more fully 
explicated is another question. 
                                          
49 For recognition that ordinary working people in a corporate structure are relevant 
participants in a corporate lawyer-client relationship, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 
U.S. 383 (1981). 
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